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Grants rejected on the basis of myth? Papers rejected for
failing to adhere to dogma? Huge projects launched on
the strength of personality cults? This doesn’t describe
our scientific community, does it? Unfortunately, we think
that it may and that this situation is damaging both the
science and the culture of human genetics research. We
fear that some of the “emperor’s new methods” are truly
without substance. Here we will share our concerns with
readers of The American Journal of Human Genetics.
Consider the historical example of bilineal pedigrees
in gene-mapping studies. In 1989, the National Institute
of Mental Health (NIMH) released a Request for Pro-
posal (RFP) for what became known as the “genebank”
project, a plan to collect families with three particular
psychiatric diseases (Alzheimer disease, schizophrenia,
and bipolar disorder). One group preparing to apply for
the RFP decided that the best way to collect families for
linkage analysis was to exclude bilineal pedigrees—that
is, families with the disease on both sides of the family.
The next thing we knew, NIMH study sections began
requiring exclusion of bilineal pedigrees as a sine qua
non of gene-mapping studies. The problem was that, at
that time, there were no actual data in support of this
practice: excluding bilineal pedigrees may have seemed
commonsensical, but it had no empirical basis.
The issue became so prominent in discussions of study
designs in psychiatric genetics that, in the early 1990s,
the MacArthur Foundation commissioned a task force
to investigate the effect of bilineal pedigrees on linkage
analysis. This task force’s report (Spence et al. 1993)
conclusively dispelled the myth that bilineal pedigrees
would lead to erroneous linkage results. As a result, the
human gene–mapping community ceased to view bili-
neality as an impediment to linkage analysis, and the
issue is seldom raised in the contemporary literature.
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This story illustrates the virtues of the scientific
method: Once put to a rigorous, empirical test, the prac-
tice of excluding bilineal pedigrees was shown to be
based on myth, and it was discontinued. Unfortunately,
recently our field has not been so successful in separating
fact from fiction.
Moreover, the story also illustrates what we see as
three pernicious themes in current human genetics re-
search (and we will introduce a fourth one below):
1. Any method, whether a data-collection strategy, an
analysis method, or a specific computer program,
once accepted, is then viewed as the only worth-
while method or approach.
2. Research approaches become established in the ab-
sence of relevant empirical evidence or even in the
face of contradictory evidence. In this way, “myths”
become established and are then treated as “facts.”
3. New methods and techniques are not rigorously
tested before being adopted as the methods of
choice.
Theme 1: The Most Popular Approach Being Taken
as the Only Acceptable One
This theme persists, though what constitutes the “only”
approach can be contradictory in spirit even over short
periods of time. For instance, from ∼1980 to 1992, the
gold-standard paradigm for gene mapping in complex
disease was to collect a small number of large, highly
multiplex pedigrees. The current view is just the oppo-
site—small families are greatly preferred over larger
ones, for many complex disorders. However, the truth
is almost certainly that neither large multiplex pedigrees
nor small families are ideal for all diseases or even for
discovery and characterization of all genes related to any
one disease.
On the other hand, the current practice of preferring
not just small but minimal family structures (such as
affected sib pairs [ASPs] or parents plus one-child triads)
is almost certainly detrimental. Not only are reviewers
reluctant to fund collection of larger pedigrees—as well
as what sometimes goes along with that, the careful
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phenotypic evaluation of all family members—but the
mania for minimal family structures extends even to the
analysis of large pedigrees. We know of federally funded
projects that collect and extensively phenotype multi-
generational pedigrees yet, when it comes time to an-
alyze the data, use only ASP statistics. We are aware of
one manuscript that was recommended for rejection by
a reviewer on the grounds that ASP methods had not
been used to analyze the data—even though the man-
uscript reported a LOD score of 120 in a sample of 97
multigenerational pedigrees! This example is extreme,
yet there is no question that the current standards in
the field embody an attitude towards ASP designs and
analytic techniques that borders on the religious.
A second example of this theme is provided by how
the field reacted to the transmission/disequilibrium test
(TDT) of Spielman et al. (1993), modeled on the elegant
paradigm of Falk and Rubinstein (1987). This method
was originally developed as a way to overcome the prob-
lem of population stratification in association studies. Its
important contribution was recognized, and more and
more variations on the TDT approach were published.
A prominent genetics journal even asked its editorial
board whether it should stop reviewing papers that did
not use the TDT and simply reject them out of hand.
(Fortunately, the editorial board said “no.”) The draw-
backs of the TDT relative to case-control studies, in-
cluding difficult family-data collection and severely re-
duced power, were seldom discussed. Furthermore, the
situation for which the TDT was designed—that is, pop-
ulation stratification—had never actually been shown to
represent a major problem for association studies.
Then, at the ASHG meeting in San Francisco, a work-
shop on “TDT and Other Tests for Linkage Disequilib-
rium,” chaired by W. J. Ewens, finally came to the con-
clusion that case-control studies also had their place and
that the hype surrounding the TDT was overblown.
Happily, the TDT, a perfectly good method, has now,
to some extent, found its place as one appropriate tool
we can use to identify disease loci and alleles, but not
the only one. However, the damage had already been
done. Manuscripts and grants had been rejected on the
basis of the semireligious adoration of the TDT com-
bined with the vilification and dismissal of the case-
control approach.
Theme 2: Scientific Practice Based on Myth Rather
Than Evidence
The bilineal pedigree story recounted above provides one
good example of a myth being accepted without evi-
dence to support it. A second example is the persistent
belief that the results from two-point linkage analysis
are in some sense “not as good” as those from multipoint
linkage analysis. It is apparently not widely understood
that the sole advantage of multipoint analysis is that
combining marker information in the form of haplotypes
may increase the information for linkage. The potential
disadvantages (e.g., greater dependence on precise and
accurate marker locations, more devastating effects of
mistyping, etc.) are seldom discussed (but see, e.g., Ter-
williger and Go¨ring 2000). Again, we are not attacking
multipoint linkage analysis as such but rather criticizing
the unfounded belief that multipoint is superior to two-
point analysis.
A third example is the myth that the so-called “non-
parametric” linkage analysis methods are better than
those based on LOD scores, since the former do not
explicitly assume a mode of inheritance. This myth per-
sists in the face of theoretical work and extensive sim-
ulations showing it to be incorrect or, at best, oversim-
plified (see, e.g., Knapp et al. 1994; Greenberg et al.
1996; Hodge 2001). Closely related to this is a fourth
example, the myth of the superiority of ASPs as a sam-
pling unit, referred to above.
Additional current myths that we could nominate in-
clude overblown beliefs about (1) the potential of asso-
ciation and linkage-disequilibrium designs to find genes
for complex traits, (2) the ability of SNPs to solve all our
problems, and (3) the power of “haplotype blocks.” We
could go on, but, more to the point, we invite readers to
think about this and to add their own myths. Look for
beliefs for which there is little or no relevant evidence or,
worse, for which the empirical literature actually con-
tradicts the belief. The point is not that these beliefs are
necessarily false, but that they are widely held despite the
lack of supporting evidence.
Theme 3: Willingness to Establish Standards
without the Protections of Rigorous Testing
This dangerous theme enables the first two to flourish.
Frequently, a new method is published, possibly after
being evaluated in only very narrowly circumscribed
ways—perhaps with respect to a single simulated data set
or with respect to a single real data set for which the truth
is unknown. Yet this new method is then applied uncrit-
ically under circumstances in which it has not been eval-
uated and for which it may never have been designed in
the first place. New computer programs are adopted with-
out rigorous testing, particularly if they are easy to use,
and very little quality control is imposed when trans-
porting programs across platforms or when applying
them in novel situations. In addition, end users, in general,
know little about whether methods are accurately imple-
mented in new programs or how to recognize when the
program has failed to give the correct answer. These
shoddy standards for validation and calibration of tools
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almost certainly contribute to a climate in which it is
extremely difficult to decide which methods are working
and which are not. This deprives us in part of the single
most important protective facet of empirical work: the
proof should be in the pudding! However, what if one
has no definition of what constitutes a palatable pudding?
Why Do Bad Things Happen to a Good Field?
What explains the emergence and persistence of these
pernicious themes in the field of human genetics? As a
recent editorial in The Journal of the American Medical
Association stated, in a somewhat narrower context,
“Finally, the current social context seems to exert a
stronger influence on the debate than the scientific ar-
guments…further consideration should be given to how
and to why the least evidence-based claims have achieved
such impressive changes in funding policy” (Fombonne
2003, pp. 88–89).
In this spirit, we hazard some guesses as to what has
happened over the past decade or so. One trend has
been an influx of statisticians, drawn to human genetics
from their parent disciplines of mathematical statistics
and biostatistics (as well as other mathematical areas),
because statistical genetics is new and exciting, and it
also offers new employment opportunities. Yet, as a
general rule, statisticians have, at best, minimal ground-
ing in biology. Rather than understanding the genetic
basis of the question, they tend to look for applications
of the statistical skills in which they are trained. This
leads to propagation of new designs and new statistical
methods that are poorly adapted to the scientific needs
of the field. At the same time, many clinicians and mo-
lecular geneticists have only a rudimentary understand-
ing of statistics, and, as a result, are prone either to rely
on the simplest methods (which they feel they under-
stand) or to rely on the recommendations of certain
experts.
Theme 4: The Unfortunate Development of a “Cult
of Personality”
By this last theme we do not mean reasonable, rational
reliance on experts, which is indeed the basis of suc-
cessful interdisciplinary collaboration. Rather, a small
number of opinion makers have arisen who seem to have
the ear of people in power. When these individuals give
an opinion, it is as if they are speaking ex cathedra.
Policy is determined, funds are allocated, and new di-
rections are set for our field, with little or no open public
discussion and sometimes in the complete absence of any
empirical evidence. The cult of personality may be our
field’s dirty little secret; it is awkward to discuss, but we
must find a way to do it, despite our discomfort. Reliance
of an entire field on the recommendations or prejudices
of a handful of individuals has, in the history of science
as a whole, proved to be a very poor method of moving
closer to the truth.
The field is faced with a situation in which its scientific
goals require enormous specialization—in the molecu-
lar, the clinical, and the statistical subsciences—as well
as intense collaboration. Perhaps what has been lost
over time is a common core grounding in human ge-
netics itself. Without that grounding, it may be inevi-
table that the field is drifting away from the mooring
of rigorous science toward a world in which major de-
cisions are based on myth, conformity, and allegiance
to leaders, rather than the facts.
If the bleak outlook we are voicing here has sub-
stance, what can be done? In writing this opinion piece,
we hope to spark discussion and action, and we by no
means claim to have all the answers ourselves. However,
we end with some of our own recommendations.
First, some things we can do as individuals:
1. As reviewers of grants and manuscripts, be open
to innovation and designs that vary from standard
or fashionable protocols, as long as the science is
well defended. There is no “sole true path.”
2. “Believe none of what you hear and only half of
what you read”; retain healthy skepticism about
all unproven (or even “proven”) assertions.
3. Insist that all new methods be tested before you
adopt them. (One valuable resource is the Genetic
Analysis Workshops, or GAWs, which have accu-
mulated 112 simulated data sets—a tremendous
aid for evaluation of new methods; see, e.g., Wijs-
man et al. [2001].)
4. Minimalism in music may be interesting, but min-
imalism in genetic data collection is disastrous. Col-
lect as much genetic and phenotypic information
on families as possible.
Finally, some things we should perhaps be doing as
a field:
1. Design and implement rigorous training programs
appropriate to the needs of human genetics in its
contemporary form, addressing statistics, epide-
miology, and clinical issues, as well as molecular
genetics. This approach must also extend to the
programs that self identify as “genome,” since they
are heavily integrated with the human genetics
community.
2. Devise mechanisms for the efficient evaluation and
comparison of new methods, specific programs,
and the performance of programs on different plat-
forms. Two mechanisms are already in place:
a. The GAWs were originally intended to provide
a mechanism for resolving some thorny argu-
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ments regarding segregation analysis, and they
were so productive that they have continued
through 13 workshops. Thus, the GAW itself
might provide a venue for addressing some of
the problems in the field. However, GAWs oc-
cur only once every 2 years, with participants
working on problems that have been distrib-
uted well in advance, thus limiting their effec-
tiveness for answering urgent questions.
b. Another possibility is a model used in the clin-
ical arena—consensus conferences, convened
when major points of clinical controversy
arise. Some version of this mechanism might
work in human genetics as well. (Indeed, the
MacArthur Foundation task force mentioned
above had much of this flavor to it.) Such con-
ferences need not achieve consensus but rather
summarize the evidence for and against dif-
ferent approaches to complex human genetics.
In conclusion, we reiterate that we are not criticizing
particular methods or approaches per se; rather, we are
criticizing how methods become accepted and how de-
cisions are made. Our suggestions above may not be
optimal, and they are certainly not exhaustive. How-
ever, if they serve as a starting point for discussions that
will lead to improvements in research protocols in hu-
man genetics, we will have accomplished our immediate
goal. Once the emperor’s “nakedness” is pointed out,
there is at least the hope of getting him some real clothes.
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